








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Halman, L. C. J. M. (1998). Religious beliefs and practices in a secular world. (WORC Paper; Vol. 98.12.012/1).
WORC, Work and Organization Research Centre.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. Jan. 2022
BMs~ aner ~ ~u~ ~~~a~~~~
Religious beliefs and practices




Wark anAOrganisation Retearch CenM
Religious beliefs and practices
in a secular world
WORC Paper 98.12.012~1
Loek Halman
Religious beliefs and practices in a secular world
1. Introduction
There is much discussion about religion in modern or late-modern society. A main feature of
this society is, according to the prevalent view, that religion has lost a substantial part of its
former significant impact on human life. In modern society, cultural factors function inde-
pendently of religion, political values are dissociated from religion, and societal morality is no
longer steered by a dominant religious orientation (Holm, 1996: 1). As a consequence, it is
assumed that modern social life suffers a decline of morality. In traditional society, religion
and morality were closely connected, and the waning of the dominant position of religion in
modernizing society fostered the establishment of a new or `permissive morality' (Wilson,
1982: 86). Modern individualized, and above all liberal, society `lacks genuine moral consen-
sus' (MacIntyre, 1981: 254).
Not infrequently, evidence for the assumed religious decline is found in the low levels of
church attendance throughout Europe. The US is an important counter case in this respect, for
church attendance there has remained high (Greeley, 1985; Caplow, 1985; Casanova, 1994;
Bruce, 1996). But figures of declining church adherence do not necessarily reveal a religious
decline in the sense of religious beliefs. There may be a discrepancy between religious prac-
tices, on the one hand, and actual beliefs on the other. In this chapter we explore the feasibility
of the ideas of secularization, not only in terms of practices, but also in terms of religious
beliefs.
The data we have at our disposal contain the traditional measures of religiousness, and as such
we can only investigate the idea of a decline. We cannot focus on new forms of religiousness
that may have developed alongside, or instead of traditional, institutional, Christian religion.
However, it must be acknowledged that the adherence to new religious movements or alterna-
tive meaning-systems is not widespread (Beckford 8z Levasseur, 1986; Thung, 1985). There
are some indications that people remain religious in the sense of being interested in spiritual-
ity or issues concerning life and death, but such interests have not yet developed in such a way
that one can speak of a new religious wave. `Ideas about "a new religious wave" need to be
seen in perspective' (Becker, de Hart 8z Mens, 1997: 184).
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Before presenting the data on religious orientations, we first return to the issue of seculariza-
tion and the current debate on this process of modernization in the domain of religion. This
brief introduction to the theme of secularization will give some ideas of what can be expected
when comparing the European societies with regard to some religious orientations and prac-
tises.
Some of the main aspects of secularization will be described in Section 2. In Section 3 we
present an overview of the religious situation in contemporary Western and Eastern Europe
distinguishing between religious beliefs and practices. Since, as will be discussed in Section 2,
Catholics and Protestants are assumed to differ in many respects and thus also in their reli-
gious orientations, we explore the main differences and similarities of both religious groups in
Section 4. In Section 5 an overview of the main shifts that occurred during the eighties in
Western Europe will be discussed and the developments in religious orientations and behav-
iour within and between several age groups will be explored more detailed. The results of
these analyses seem to demonstrate that there is not so much a religious crisis as an institu-
tional crisis.
2. Religious decline: the secularization thesis
In the religious domain, the trajectory of modernization is usually interpreted by social
scientists under the heading of secularization. Although in empirical research, as well as in
theoretical discussions, the concept of secularization has different meanings and interpreta-
tions, there is general agreement that it refers to the process in which religion gradually loses
the encompassing and important role which it had in traditional society. Some attribute the
gradual decline of religion to the rationalization and de-enchantment of the world, while
others explain the decreased significance of religious institutions, religious activities, and
religious modes of thinking, by reference to social differentiation and specialization, as the
main forces of modernization (Wilson, 1982). Due to cultural and social differentiation,
people in contemporary society have to participate in different universes of ineaning, each
governed by its own set of values. In fact, as Mattei Dogan has noted, the `state has dispos-
sessed the church of some of its traditional functions (such as schools, hospices, social wel-
fare, registry of births, marriages and deaths, culture, and organization of leisure)' (Dogan,
1995: 416). Institutional domains have become segmented in the sense that within each
institutional sphere norms and values have become functional, rational and above all autono-
mous. Arguing along such lines, secularization can be seen as `the repercussion of these
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changes on the religious subsystem. It denotes a societal process in which an overarching and
transcendent religious system is reduced to a subsystem of society alongside other subsys-
tems, the overarching claims of which have a shrinking relevance' (Dobbelaere, 1995: 1).
Religion is assumed to have become marginalized and consequently it is assumed to have lost
much of its influence on people's lives.
The individual has become the main point of reference in the shaping of values, attitudes, and
beliefs, and the likelihood that people feel attracted to traditional religion and the conventional
beliefs preached by the church has declined. Increasingly people believe in what they them-
selves want to believe in, and this is not necessarily what the churches tell them to believe. In
traditional societies individual belief systems were strongly dependent on what the commu-
nity believed and the churches prescribed. Social control and the religious practices of the
community played an important decisive role for the individual's belief system. Religious
feelings in modern or late modern society are less open to social control and are more rooted
in the personality. As such traditional dogmatic beliefs have been replaced by a more modern,
personalized way of believing, and religious decline is mainly confined to institutional de-
cline. As we will see in one of the subsequent chapters on political orientations, this institu-
tional decline is not limited to the churches. All traditional, authoritarian institutions suffer a
loss of confidence.
This decreasing importance of religion, is seen as merely a more or less `natural' consequence
of societies that are becoming more and more rational. Such a view took Weber (1921-1922,
1972) when he described modernity in terms of the transformation of traditional religious
authority to rational legal authority. Inglehart ( 1997) argues in a similar way. An increasing
sense of security has diminished the need for absolute rules as imposed by the churches, while
it reduced the importance of religious views for, for example, the maintenance of the family
unit. Further, people experience inconsistencies in their world views and daily experiences
when confronted with the traditional religious traditions: `the daily life experience of people
today is basically different from the kind of life experience that shaped the Judaeo-Christian
tradition. [.....] today we live in an advanced industrial society, in which computers are far
likelier than sheep to be part of one's daily experience. Consequently, not only the social
norms, but also the symbols and world view of the established religions, are not as persuasive
or compelling as they were in their original setting' (Inglehart, 1990: 179).
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According to Inglehart, religious decline might thus be seen as a result of increasing rational-
ity, functional differentiation and specialization and increasing levels of security, produced by
the establishment of the modern welfare state and material wealth. In modern, affluent societ-
ies, a gradual shift can be observed `from emphasis on economic and physical security above
all, toward greater emphasis on belonging, self-expression, and the quality of life' (Inglehart,
1990: 11). This value shift from a predominant materialistic orientation towards a post-
materialistic one is expected to be `accompanied by declining emphasis on traditional politi-
cal, religious, moral, and social norms' (Inglehart, 1990: 66). In other words, in highly devel-
oped countries, the increase of post-materialism will be accompanied by changes in the
traditional, church-influenced social values and morality. In economically less advanced
countries, materialism will be the dominant orientation and religion will have remained an
important determining factor for various spheres of social life, whereas in economically more
developed areas the importance of religion has declined. Here a decreasing number of people
is inclined to accept part and parcel of the traditional religious dogmas. `The churches have
lost much of their impact ad intra: as a consequence, individuals may reject the `menu' of
church beliefs, instead recomposing a religion à la carte - constructing their own religious
patchwork' (Jagodzinski 8z Dobbelaere, 1995: 115). Such privatized religious patch works are
especially assumed to be on the increase outside the core of the church constituencies.
Recently a new phenomenon has entered the discourse on modernization: the globalization of
human society. Globalization has been defined `as the intensification of worldwide social
relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events
occurring many miles away and vice versa' (Giddens, 1990: 64). According to modernization
theory, Western society has experienced a gradual transformation from a traditional society
towards an industrial, and more recently modern industrial society has transformed into a
post-modern order. `Globalization theories add to this thesis that modernization in the West
has directly resulted in the spread of certain vital institutions of Western modernization to the
rest of the globe, especially the modern capitalist economy, the nation-state, and scientific
rationality in the form of modern technology; and, critically, that this global spread has
resulted in a new social unit which is much more than a simple expansion of Western moder-
nity' (Beyer, 1994: 8). One of the implications of globalization is that people are confronted
with increasing numbers of opportunities and alternative options. People are assumed increas-
ingly to encounter a great variety of cultural habits, values and norms. As a result of global-
ization people `are faced with an extending range of imaginary and information involving
models of citizenship, forms of production, styles of consumption, modes of communication,
principles of world order and, in addition, ways of reacting to all of these. There is enhanced
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capacity for reflection as a result of the exposure to globalized social processes. A main
consequence of this is that the individual has tended to develop increased expectations of
personal fulfilment and satisfaction. This has produced various alternative or modified
lifestyles' (Spybey, 1996: 9). However, the acceptance of such various kinds of alternatives
would not occur if the processes of individualization and secularization had not liberated the
individual from the institutional constraints. In traditional societies people were not only
living in small local communities separated from other communities, they were also strongly
influenced and dominated by traditional institutions, such as religion. In particular the chur-
ches played an important role in these traditional settings. Economic growth, the spread of
affluence, rising levels of education, increased mobilization, increased technological knowl-
edge and its many applications, have reduced the previously dominating role of religion in
human society (Berger, 1967; Luckmann, 1967; Inglehart, 1990; 1995; 1997). Due to increas-
ing individualization, people are assumed to have become increasingly free and autonomous
in selecting the convictions, beliefs, and practices they want. Decisions are no longer based on
what the religious institutions prescribe, but what the individual wants. In a globalized world,
this freedom and autonomy of the individual implies that people can pick and choose what
they want from the global religious and cultural marketplace.
Since we focus mainly on the `traditional' indicators of religion: religious beliefs and prac-
tices, the developments described thus far lead to the presumption that traditional belief
systems, taught by the churches and in earlier days presumed to be acknowledged by the
majority of churched people, are gradually replaced by diversified individual belief systems
and moral convictions. The available empirical data do not include other measures of religion
or religiousness, such as adherence to new religious movements or new age beliefs. It is often
assumed that modernization in general and processes of secularization and individualization in
particular do not so much reveal a religious decline as an institutional decline. For instance, it
has been argued that there is `only the loss by religion of its traditional societal and public
functions, and the privatization and marginalization of religion within its own differentiated
sphere' (Casanova, 1994: 19). People have not become less religious, but less inclined to
follow the traditionally religious doctrines as prescribed and imposed by the churches. Ing-
lehart, for example, argues that although there is a continuing decline in traditional religious
beliefs, there is nevertheless a growing concern for the meaning and purpose of life (Inglehart,
1997: 80).
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In this chapter we explore the religious orientations of Europeans, and we will empirically
investigate the appropriateness of speaking of contemporary Europe in terms of being secular.
We do not include the USA in our analyses, because the trajectory of secularization in the US
is different from that in Europe. In many studies it is emphasized that theoretical expectations
and predictions are refuted empirically in the US where hardly anything has changed in this
respect. Thus, it has been said that the thesis of secularization is wrong (Stark, 1997a: 18).
According to Stark and Iannaccone (1994: 231) it is therefore better no longer to use the term
secularization in theoretical discourse. In the US religion seems to have persisted as is demon-
strated in much empirical research (Greeley, 1989). Finke and Stark (1992) have presented
evidence that contrary to what is predicted from the theory of secularization, the trend of
religious adherence in the US shows an increase and not a decrease between 1776 and 1990.
Based time series data, Caplow concludes that the developments in the US can best be under-
stood as a trend `away from secularization, and towards what might be called sacralization'
(Caplow, 1985: 103).
Others, mainly social scientists in Europe, claim the opposite. Secularization is taking place
and in many countries it is even accelerating: religion is definitely on the wane in contempo-
rary society. Thus, in the eyes of European sociologists, the US is the exceptional case,
because it appears to be the only country where modernization is not accompanied by secu-
larization. However, as Martin writes, maybe Europe is the exceptional case (Martin, 1996:
35). If he is right in claiming that Europe is the exception, it implies that secularization as it is
defined and investigated these days is primarily a European affair.
However, it must be noted that the declining levels of religious adherence in Europe are just
one manifestation of secularization. As Yamane says, `secularization occurs when religious
authority structures decline in their ability to control societal-level institutions, meso-level
organizations, and individual-level beliefs and behaviors' (Yamane, 1997: 115). At the
societal level secularization can `be understood as the declining capacity of religious elites to
exercise authority over other institutional spheres. Secularization at the organizational level
may be understood as the religious authority's declining control over organizational resources
within the religious sphere. And secularization at the individual level may be understood as
the decrease in the extent to which individual actions are subject to religious control' (Chaves,
1994: 757). In fact this description of secularization resembles the way in which Dobbelaere
has defined the concept in terms of declining religious involvement, `laicization' and religious
change (Dobbelaere, 1981: 11-12; see also McGuire, 1987; Wilson, 1982).
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So, the trajectory of modernization in the domain of religion relates to three interrelated
processes of change: a decreasing number of people that feel attracted to the traditional
institutional religion, a shift from belief in the traditional religious doctrines towards a per-
sonal belief, and finally a decline of the dominating role of the church and religious leaders in
society. Translated into empirical terms it means that we expect a decline in traditional
beliefs, but not in religiosity as such.
Most empirical research focuses on religious decline, which means that is the scope of most
research is limited to the individual level: beliefs and practices. In general it can be concluded
that religiousness, measured by such indicators generally declined throughout Europe. How-
ever, Europe will be far from homogeneous as far as religious orientations are concerned. If,
as Casanova does, secularization is seen as a modern historical process and if the idea is
accepted that `the Protestant Reformation, the rise of the modern state, the rise of modern
capitalism, and the rise of modern science - set in motion the dynamics of the process by
undermining the medieval system and themselves became at the same time the carriers of the
process of differentiation, of which secularization is one aspect, then it follows that one
should expect different historical patterns of secularization. As each of these carriers devel-
oped different dynamics in different places and at different times, the patterns and the out-
comes of the historical process of secularization should vary accordingly' (Casanova, 1994:
24-25).
In Europe, an important distinction is expected to exist between Catholic and Protestant
cultures. Both traditions have `shaped enduring nationalcultures that persist today' (Inglehart,
1995: 393). Even five centuries after the Reformation, there are obvious differences between
Northern and Southern Europe with regard to the importance of the religious factor and often
these differences are attributed to the religious traditions in the North and the South. In
Europe secularization `has been an uneven process. It has affected the major Protestant
Churches more strongly than the Catholic Church, and more fundamentalist brands of Protes-
tantism least' (Therborn, 1995: 274). The explanation for this uneven process is partly found
in the theological differences between Catholicism and Protestantism. The `seeds of individu-
alism were manifest much earlier in Protestantism. In contrast to Catholics, Protestants are
personally responsible before God in religious matters, and the church has a lesser role as
mediator between the believer and God. The Catholic Church, with its extensive, dogmatic,
collective creed imposes a more collective identity upon its faithful' (Jagodzinski 8z Dob-
belaere, 1995a: 81).
8
Needless to say, there will be other explanations for the differences in levels of religious
involvement in Catholic and Protestant countries. Some of these focus on economic factors. In
general, countries in Northern Europe score higher on wealth and prosperity than countries in
the Southern part of Europe. Since it has been assumed that `economic development goes
hand in hand with a decline in religious sentiment' (Wald quoted by Lipset, 1996: 62), the
north-south cultural divide might also be explained by such economic differences. That the
differences in economic development can, in their turn, be explained by the differences in
religious traditions, is a classical and disputed theory that will not be discussed in this chapter.
However, whatever the explanation, the impact of religion is generally assumed to be stronger
in Catholic countries compared with Protestant countries, where the religious involvement is
considerably lower, the level of confidence in the churches weaker, etc. (Ester et al., 1994).
Furthermore, it has been argued that the differences in labour market policies, family policies,
and social insurance policies between Catholic and Protestant countries can be attributed to
the differences in religious traditions (Castles, 1994). Thus, the divide between Protestantism
and Catholicism is assumed to have had far-reaching socio-political implications (Therborn,
1995: 213).
In his analysis of the post-modernization dimension Inglehart found empirical evidence for
the Catholic-Protestant divide in Europe. The fact that countries are dominated by a certain
religious tradition appeared more important for similarities in basic value orientations than
their geographic proximity (Inglehart, 1997: 95). His `cultural geography of the world'
substantiates the idea of a Catholic cultural profile that can be distinguished from a Protestant
profile. Furthermore his analysis demonstrated that the cultural profile of Catholics is a global
phenomenon in the sense that all Catholic cultures are close to each other in the cultural space.
Empirical evidence for the cultural differences between the two religious traditions was also
presented by Peter Gundelach who observed that the denomination of a country plays a crucial
role in the differential decline in `familism' in Europe (Gundelach, 1994) .
The expectation in Europe therefore is, that a Catholic religious pattern can be observed that is
distinctive from a Protestant pattern. But to this it can be added that the religious pattern will
be dependent upon, what can be called, the `religious economy' of a country. In analogy to
mainstream economic theories some have argued that religious competition results in substan-
tially higher levels of religiosity and church affiliation. The argument goes as follows: `Reli-
gious economies are like commercial economies in that they consist of a market of current and
potential consumers, a set of firms seeking to serve that market, and religious "product lines"
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offered by various firms (..). Also like commercial economies, religious economies thrive
when they are allowed to operate without government interference' (Yamane, 1997: 111). A
pluralistic religious situation will be conducive to `a wide range of alternative faiths well
adapted to the needs of the consumers' (Iannaccone, 1992: 128). Therefore a key variable for
explaining high levels of religious commitment and religiousness is the degree of competition
among the suppliers of religion. In mono-religious cultures, there is no competition and thus
low levels of religious activity is to be expected, whereas in religiously pluralistic cultures,
people will be more active and more religious.
Further, we may expect a religious pattern in Eastern Europe that differs from the pattern in
Western Europe. `The Soviet regime of the past 40 years in Central and Eastern Europe was
ideologically opposed to religion and religious activity. Religious activity was at least dis-
couraged and, in some cases, severely repressed in each of the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe under Soviet domination following World War II' (Gautier, 1997: 289).
However, it must be acknowledged that former socialist regimes oppressed religion and the
churches to varying degrees. In Bulgaria, for example, the Orthodox Churches accommodated
with the regime, whereas the Catholic church in Poland strongly opposed the political regime.
In general Protestant churches in many Eastern and Central European countries `established a
policy of a"church within socialism" in order to ensure at least a modicum of legitimacy'
(Gautier, 1997: 290).
Despite its opposition to the regime of the Polish Catholic church, no severe actions against
the church were undertaken. In Hungary, on the other hand, the church was severely subju-
gated and controlled by the state as was the case in Czech and Slovak regions (Pro Mundi
Vita, 1984~2). Even under Soviet domination the catholic church remained in a strong position
in Poland and some even claim that the Western orientation and the global organization of the
Catholic church helped shape Polish `national identification in terms of Western culture'
(Gautier, 1997: 290). This applies to the Catholic church in Hungary too, but not to the
Protestant churches in Hungary and East Germany which accommodated with the regimes and
therefore were `identified in the eyes of the people as operating in cooperation with the Soviet
state'. As a consequence these churches lost their `credibility among religious believers, who
then disaffiliated in substantial numbers' (Gautier, 1997: 290; see also Caplow, 1985: 106).
The Eastern European religious pattern therefore is assumed to be different from the religious
outlook in the West, but as in the West the religious pattern will not be very homogeneous.
The degree to which these patterns are indeed heterogeneous will be explored in greater detail
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using empirical data from the European Values Studies.
3. Mapping Europe's religiousness: an overview
The question how far secularization has proceeded in contemporary Europe touches at the
question how religious or secular European society is. As Dobbelaere argues, the timing and
pace of the religious decline `differs from one country to the next and from one Church to
another' (Dobbelaere, 1995: 1; see also Sigelman, 1977; Campbell 8c Curtis, 1994; Wuthnow,
1977). As was explained before, secularization defined in terms of `the declining scope of
religious authority needs to be viewed on three levels' (Yamane, 1997: 115), and thus the
religious situation has to be investigated at three different levels: the societal, organizational
and individual level, or: macro, meso and micro (Dobbelaere, 1981; 1997). The differences
and similarities in religiousness can be explored in various ways, for example by examining
the integration of church~religion and society, by evaluating the organizational development
of the churches and other religious bodies or by probing people's religious beliefs and prac-
tices (Gustafsson, 1994). In this Chapter religiousness is measured at the individual level. We
will focus first on religious beliefs and secondly on religious practices in contemporary
Europe.
3.1 Religious beliefs
The EVS data include a multitude of indicators to measure several dimensions of religiosity. A
first dimension relates to religious ideology or religious doctrines. Each religion `maintains
some set of beliefs which adherents are expected to ratify' (Stark 8c Glock, 1968: 14), and the
more of these beliefs people adhere to, the stronger believer they are said to be. Such a dimen-
sion of religious faith refers to traditional religion and does not indicate a more general
religious attitude. A more general dimension does not include specific statements about the
content of religiosity, nor does it refer to institutional religion or concrete rules and dogmas.
Being religious in a more general way may even be applicable to people who do not belong to
or feel attracted by one of the traditional religions or churches (De Moor, 1987: 22).
Apart from indices for these two `religious' dimensions, there are items available that tap the
way in which people interpret the meaning of human life, death and suffering. Generally,
religion is understood as providing people with explanations and interpretations of the cosmos
and human existence. Religion deals with `ultimate concerns' (Yinger, 1977). Religion has to
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do with `ultimate meaning' (Luckmann, 1967). Bellah defines religion in similar functionalist
terms: religion is `a set of symbolic forms and acts that relate man to the ultimate conditions
of his existence' (Bellah, 1970: 21). This view on the function of religion is not confined to
Western civilization, but appears more or less a universal phenomenon. In almost all cultures,
religion provides people with meanings, interpretations, and explanations for crisis situations
in people's lives (Geertz, 1973). Religion formulates answers to understand and cope with the
world and human life. Traditional Christian religion offered a view `that explains the origin of
and the meaning behind the cosmos and human existence within the context of a transcendent
and supernatural order, and it interprets the crises in the lives of human beings, suffering and
death, good and evil in the light of a higher order' (Felling, Peters 8z Schreuder, 1991: 14).
Now that modern Western society is assumed to have become secular, such a traditional
religious Christian meaning system in which reference is made to a higher order, is expected
to be no longer dominant. People will be less inclined to approach the origin and meaning of
the cosmos and human life from a theistic viewpoint. As Luckmann (1967) has argued,
traditional Christian institutional religion is no longer the only provider of ineaning in secular
society. In modern society, traditional religion has to compete with other systems that also
aim to supply people with meaning and explanation. The EVS data contain few indices to tap
one of such alternative meaning systems, the immanentist world view. It can be argued that
more world views are competing, but EVS is not equipped to measure them.'
3.1.1 Religious faith
In EVS various traditional Christian belief statements were included and respondents were
asked whether or not they believed in the following: God, life after death, a soul, the devil,
hell, heaven, sin, resurrection, re-incarnation. Overall in Europe, a majority of people are
believers in three areas: belief in God (600~0), the existence of a soul (SOo~o) and belief in sin
(480~0). When it comes to issues like life after death (360~0), heaven (350~0), resurrection (29oro),
hell (190~0) and devil (200~0), fewer people are inclined to believe in them. Table 3.1 displays
the observed answer patterns in each country. Remarkable is the proportion of Hungarians
believing in a soul (130~0). It is unclear why so few Hungarians believe in a soul whereas
overall half of the European population believes in it.
These figures reveal rather clearly that Eastern Germany, Czech Republic and Bulgaria, are
least religious in Europe as far as traditional Christian doctrines are concerned. Poles and Irish
people, on the other hand, appear most religious. The Eastern German, Czech and Bulgarian
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cases are corroborating the thesis about the religious market theory to explain high levels of
religiousness from religious competition (Finke, 1990; Iannaccone, 1991; Stark 8z Iannaccone,
1994; Stark, 1997b). Mono-religious cultures are likely to display lower levels of religious
belief. Eastern Germany, Czech Republic and Bulgaria are mono-religious and thus seem to
confirm such ideas. However, Poland, Ireland and Romania are clearly refuting the thesis, for
these countries are mono-religious as well, but nevertheless their populations appear to be
more religious in a traditional way.
Table 3.1 Proportions of Europeans believing in God, life after death, soul, devil,
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The pattern found in the Netherlands is also a contradiction of what the religious market
theorists predict. The religiously pluralistic situation in the Netherlands has not resulted in
firm believers. On the contrary, the highest levels of religious faith are found in mono-reli-
gious countries like Ireland and Poland. It seems as if it is not Europe which is the exception,
but America.
A pattern that is somewhat more strongly supported by the results is the distinction between
Catholic and Protestant cultures. In general Protestant countries are less religious compared
with Catholic countries. The Scandinavians are far less inclined to accept the faith items than
people in Southern Catholic countries or in Poland, and Ireland. Germany, Great Britain and
the Netherlands are in between these extremes, but these countries are more pluralistic in the
sense that Catholic and Protestant churches are both part of their cultures.
In Eastern Europe Catholic domination has not always resulted in higher levels of traditional
belief. Czech Republic is a salient example in this respect. The situation in this country will be
very different from what is observed in Poland where the Catholic church remained strong
despite the communist regime. The church has always played an important role as `the pri-
mary vehicle for political and cultural resistance to "outside" (communist) domination'
(Doktór, 1996: 54). In general it can be concluded that `where the church has been linked with
recent national formation, religious beliefs and practices have maintained themselves much
better than in other countries' (Therborn, 1995: 274). Poland, but also Ireland are clear exam-
ples in this respect as far as the Catholic church is concerned, and Romania as far as Orthodox
church is concerned. The case of Eastern Germany can be seen as a result of a harshly sanc-
tioning religious clergy in this country (Gautier, 1997: 291). As a result, `the success of
communist secularization was both striking and persistent' (Therborn, 1995: 292).
Belief in reincarnation was also part of the list of beliefs included in the questionnaire that
was presented to the respondents. According to some, this belief maybe interpreted as an
indication of new religious needs (e.g. Stoetzel, 1983: 95-96). At least, it is assumed, that re-
incarnation is one of the few items in the European Values Study questionnaire referring to
religiosity outside the official mode (Riis, 1994: 104). Statistical analyses show that belief in
re-incarnation is of a different order than belief in the traditional statements. This is, of course,
`easily explicable, for it is not an explicitly Christian belief(Harding et al., 1986: 48).
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As Wilson and Dobbelaere have argued, in a context `where there has developed a strong
belief that only in this world is pleasure available, the desire to perpetuate or repeat earthly
life has made conceptions of reincarnation increasingly congenial' (Wilson 8c Dobbelaere,
1994: 219). As a consequence it can be expected that the idea of re-incarnation was more
widespread among more individualistic, more modern, most secularized people. However,
belief in reincarnation is, however, not widespread, not even in most secular countries, for
example East Germany, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark and Sweden. Contrary to what
might have been expected, belief in reincarnation is strongest in Poland (32oro), while it is 170~0
overall in Europe (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 Proportions of respondents who believe in re-incarnation
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As far as the Polish case is concerned, Doktór has observed that `traditional and alternative
religion seem to be equally strong' (Doktór, 1996: 54). The explanation for this result was not
easy to find and the author suggested several interpretations. He argues that it could be the
result of `a greater inclusiveness of religious beliefs in Catholic and mono- religious countries,
where, due to the absence of other religious alternatives, the religious identity is not so clearly
defined and differentiated as in religiously pluralistic countries' (Doktór, 1996: 55). However,
the mono-religious situation in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Ireland have not resulted in a
similar widespread belief in re-incarnation. Also Doktór's suggestion that it may be attributed
to the oppression of religion during the communist regime and that as a result of that `all types
of religion were mystified and gained support' (idem) does not seem to be corroborated by
other Eastern European countries such as Eastern Germany and Czech Republic who experi-
enced a similar oppressive regime, but where belief in reincarnation is rather limited. Belief in
reincarnation in Eastern Germany is found among 110~0 of the respondents, and in the Czech
Republic among 90~0. The case of Eastern Germany not only opposes the view that a mono-
religious situation is conducive to the development of a diversified belief system, but also the
idea that the repression of religion by the former communist regime has resulted in an increase
in alternative religious beliefs. Also the third alternative explanation forwarded by Doktór,
seems to be challenged as well. He argues that adherence to alternative religions in Poland
might be understood as `a phenomenon fulfilling diversified individual religious needs in an
otherwise monopolistic religious market' (Doktór, 1996: 55). Most other countries character-
ized by a monopolistic religious market display lower levels of belief in reincarnation and as
such they demonstrate that this suggestion is not very convincing.
3.1.2 Religiosity
In EVS, respondents were asked how important God is in daily life, if one is a religious
person, if one believes in either a personal God or a spirit force, if one finds comfort and
strength from religion, and if one prays or meditates outside religious ceremonies. These items
are indicative of a kind of religiosity that may even be applicable to people who do not belong
to or feel attracted by one of the official churches. Such items reveal a subjective religious
disposition or `diffuse religiosity' (Riis, 1994: 105), that is `concerned with religious experi-
ences, those feelings, perceptions, and sensations which are experienced by an actor or de-
fined by a religious group (or a society) as involving some communication, however slight,
with a divine essence, that is, with God, with ultimate reality, with transcendental authority'
(Stark 8z Glock, 1968: 15). Table 3.2 reports on the empirical findings, revealing significant
cross-national variations in religious patterns.
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As was observed with respect to the responses to the traditional Christian religious belief
statements, the answer pattern within each country is more or less similar on all indicators of
diffuse or personal religiosity or emotional religious disposition. An exception to this general
rule is personal prayer in Iceland, which deviates more from the European mean than the other
indicators deviate from the mean European pattern. In Norway a reverse situation can be
observed. Here people appear less religious, but they are more likely to pray or meditate.
Although the deviations from the overall means varies from country to country, it is more or
less clear that Swedes, Bulgarians, Eastern Germans, and Czech people, appear less religious
on all items compared with other Europeans in general, and Polish, Irish, and Italians in
particular. Somewhat unexpected is the proportion of Irish people that answered affirmatively
to the question: Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are a
religious person? The Irish response (720~0) resembles the responses in Portugal (680~0) and
Austria (690~0), but also the response rates in Denmark (680~0), Romania (740~0), Slovakia
(690~0), and Iceland (740~0), whereas in general one might have expected that Irish people
would resemble the Poles and people in Southern Europe. Relatively large numbers of Irish
people report that they are not a religious person (about 270~0). Denmark represents an excep-
tional case too, for 680~0 of its citizens consider themselves religious persons, which is more
than twice as many as in Sweden (290~0). On other measures, however, Denmark is close to the
Swedish pattern.
While religiosity may be less widespread among the Swedes, Eastern Germans, French,
Norwegians, Bulgarians and Czech people, this does not imply that there are large numbers of
atheists in these countries. The proportions of people reporting that they are convinced athe-
ists is rather limited in Europe. The highest proportion is found in Eastern Germany (170~0).
Overall in Europe it is about So~o. Thus, despite the fact that about one in every three Europe-
ans does not consider hirrirherself a religious person, about 900~0 of them are not convinced
atheists.
However, the use of the word `religious' may be confusing and widely misunderstood. This
appears in the answers to the question on the content of people's beliefs. Respondents were
asked: `Which of the following statements comes closest to your beliefs'. The statements
were:
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Table 3.2 Proportions of respondents who is religious, who believes in a`personal
God', who gets comfort from religion, who takes moments of prayer and
for whom God is important in their lives (score 8-10 on 10-point scale: 1-
not important; 10 - very important)
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Table 3.3 Percentages of the non-religious respondents that believe in a personal
God, a spirit or life force, who do not know what to believe in and who do
not believe in a personal God or life force, by country (number of non-
religious people in brackets)
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1. There is a personal God
2. There is some sort of spirit or life force
3. I don't really know what to think
4. I don't think there is any sort of spirit, God or life force.
It is remarkable that even among those who did not consider themselves religious, over two-
fifths (about 43oro) claimed to believe in a`personal God' or spirit or life force (Table 3.3).
Apparently, they are believers, but they do not want to be seen as religious. Maybe that for
many people `religious' is associated with clergy (priests etc.) and therefore people do not
want to consider themselves as religious. In Ireland this is the pattern found frequently. 74oro
and 840~o respectively of the non-religious people in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic,
respectively, claim that they believe in either a personal God or a spirit force.
As far as the content of belief is concerned, secularization and individualization are assumed
to have moved society `from some sacred condition to successively secular conditions in
which the sacred evermore recedes' (Hammond, 1985: 1). In particular those beliefs that are at
the core of institutional, traditional Christian religiosity will be affected by these moderniza-
tion processes. The traditional Christian doctrine `identifies God as the agent who governs
life. God is assumed to have a purpose for each person's life' (Wuthnow, 1976: 3-4). In
Christianity, God is regarded the ultimate source of ineaning and interpretation. As expected,
adherence to this view is no longer dominant in the Scandinavian countries, Eastern Germany
and Czech Republic, the highly secularized societies. The belief in a personal God hardly
exists in these countries or in Bulgaria. However, apart from Eastern Germany, in these
countries some kind of belief in an ultimate reality is found in one in every three citizens. It
seems reasonable to draw the conclusion that even in a secularized world, the sacred seems to
be remarkably alive (Hammond, 1985). In East Germany, almost half of the population does
not believe in a God or spirit or life force. In no other country is this denial of an extra-empiri-
cal reality so widespread. This maybe attributed to the severe repression of religion by the
Soviet authorities. `Repression of religious expression,..., may have been especially harsh in
East Germany, the model of Soviet society to the West' (Gautier, 1997: 292).
The impact of Soviet anti-religious rule, may also explain the results obtained in some of the
other Central and Eastern European societies: Hungary and the Czech Republic. However, the
observations in Slovakia and Romania do not confirm these ideas. Nihilism, the rejection of
the existence of a God or life force, is not frequently found here. On the other hand it is a
pattern that is more frequently found in Bulgaria (340~0). So, Soviet domination is no the only
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source of explanation for a specific pattern of belief in Eastern and Central Europe. The cross-
national differences appear too great to justify the conclusion that the countries in Eastern and
Central Europe have developed a distinctive religious model as a consequence of the period of
Soviet domination.
3.1.3 The world views of Europeans
The conclusion that belief in a supernatural power or life force is still remarkably alive in
present European society, does not imply, however, that people still desire to explain and
understand the origin and meaning of human life and the cosmos in the context of a transcen-
dent and supernatural order. According to the prevalent theory on secularization the theistic
view has declined in importance and adherence. Such a view can be described as `an under-
standing of life that identifies God as the agent who governs life. God is assumed to have a
purpose for each person's life' (Wuthnow, 1976: 3-4). It is the view that God is the source of
meaning and interpretation. The EVS data seem to confirm this idea. Most Europeans do not
refer to God when asked about the meaning of life and death. Instead most people regard
issues of life, death and suffering as just `natural events' which have a meaning in themselves.
Large majorities of the Europeans (three-quarters and more) agree with statements like:
- the meaning of life is that you try to get the best out of it (760~0);
- death is inevitable; it is pointless to worry about it (740~0);
- if you have lived your life, death is a natural resting point (790~0).
Agreement with theistic views is much lower than agreement with these immanentist views.
The theistic view appears in the items:
- life is meaningful because God exists (30aro);
- death has a meaning only if you believe in God (29oro);
- in my opinion, sorrow and suffering only have a meaning if you believe in God (250~0).
As can be observed in Figure 3.2, Europe is not homogeneous in these world views, not only
with regard to the `new', non-traditional, immanentist world views, but also with respect to
the theistic views.
However, a general pattern seems to be that the theistic world view is more dominant in the
traditional religious (Catholic) countries. People in Poland, Ireland, followed by people in
Southern Europe, and Slovakia appear more in favour of the theistic view than other popu-
lations. The lowest numbers of adherents are found in the Netherlands, Belgium, the Nordic
21
countries, Eastern Germany, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states: Latvia and
Estonia.
A general conclusion seems to be that a theistic view is not limited to one issue or life event,
but is related to various life events. The same pattern exists in the opposite direction; non-
acceptance is not limited to one domain, but occurs with respect to other domains as well. The
mean inter-item correlation between these items is .51, and Cronbach's alpha indicated that
the reliability of a scale with these items is high (a -.76). The answers to the indicators of the
immanentist view are less in the same direction (mean inter-item correlation -.27; a-.52).
Nevertheless we have combined the answers to these immanentist items in one scale.
~ ~ ~ ~
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-. - best out of life ~ death inevitable ~ death resting point
-.- meaning God -z- death God -~- sorrow God
Figure 3.2 Proportions of respondents agreeing with the statement that the meaning
of life is to get the best out of it; that death is inevitable; that death is a
natural resting point; that life has meaning because God exists; that death
has meaning because God exists; that suffering has meaning if one believes
in God
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In the three German speaking countries (East and West Germany and Austria), there appears
to be a discrepancy between the views on death as a natural resting point and trying to get the
best out of your life, on the one hand, and the viewpoint that it is pointless to worry about
death, on the other hand. The latter viewpoint is accepted less than the two other statements.
Lithuanian people appear least of all adhering to this view on the meaning and interpretation
of life.
Although theistic views are more widespread in Poland and Ireland compared with other
countries, even in these countries there is widespread agreement with the statements revealing
the immanentist view. In the Czech Republic as well as in Slovakia, people are inclined to
accept almost unanimously that death is inevitable and merely a natural resting point, but to a
much lesser extent are they of the opinion that the meaning of life is that you try to get the
best out of it. People in the three Baltic states as well as in Bulgaria, resemble the Czechs and
Slovak people in their interpretation of the meaning of life. However, this view is not typical
for Eastern Europe, for in Poland, Eastern Germany and in Hungary in particular people are
much more favourable to the viewpoint that you have to get the best out of life.
3.1.4 Cross national similarities and differences in religious profiles
An overview of the main cross-national similarities and differences in religiousness can be
obtained from a cluster analysis2 of the countries on the basis of religious indicators we have
explored thus far. The analysis yielded four clusters of countries. Cluster 1 comprises Spain,
Portugal, Austria, Slovakia, West Germany and Latvia; cluster 2: Great Britain, Iceland,
Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Hungary and France; cluster 3 combines East Germany,
Bulgaria, Sweden, the Czech Republic and Denmark; cluster 4 contains Northern Ireland,
Ireland, Italy, Romania and Poland. These results do not reveal a clear patterning of countries:
Europe's map of religiousness is rather confusing. There is no uniform Eastern and Central
European model, nor is there a clear discernible Nordic or Southern European pattern, nor a
clear Catholic-Protestant differentiation. What is revealed, however, is that secularization has
not occurred throughout Europe at a similar pace. In fact, the results of our analyses thus far,
refute the idea of Therborn that the Nordic pattern is similar to the Eastern pattern. He noted
that `the Nordic countries,...., turn out rather similar to Eastern Europe, in particular to the
non-Catholic parts of the latter' (Therborn, 1995: 274). In Figure 3.3 the countries' mean
scores on religiosity and traditional belief are displayed in two dimensional space.
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Sweden is indeed close to Czech Republic, Bulgaria and East Germany, but Norway and
Denmark are at a distance of these countries. Besides, Sweden and the other Nordic countries
are Lutheran, while the Bulgarians are mainly Orthodox. It may be that, indeed, as noted
before, the non-religious attitudes of people in the three Eastern European countries can be
attributed to Soviet anti-religious policies. The Swedish exceptional position, however, cannot
be attributed to this influence. According to Susan Sundback, the non-religious orientation of
the Swedes can be explained from a variety of historical and contextual reasons. One of these
factors is the early `desacralisation' of the public world-view caused by the unparalleled
strong position of the Social Democratic political party in Sweden. This political party took
over the power from the Lutheran Churches to define meaning and the interpretation of social
life. Further, she argues, the Swedish political, intellectual and cultural climate has been
highly pragmatic for a long period of time, and this climate was not very conducive to the
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Figure 3.3 Countries' mean scores on religiosity and traditional belief
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It is clear that secularization and individualization have affected Polish and Irish society to a
much lesser extent than other countries. Religiosity has remained at a high level in these
Catholic countries and this religiosity is still mainly traditional. The pattern as far as transcen-
dental and immanentist views are concerned is far from clear either, although some evidence
can be found for a Catholic-Protestant divide in Europe (see Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4 Countries' mean scores on transcendental and immanentist world views
If the immanentist view represents an alternative for the traditional theistic view, it could have
been expected that this view was more widespread in the Nordic, more secularized countries.
But as has been observed, such a view is equally popular in highly traditional religious
countries like Poland and Ireland. As far as the transcendental orientation is concerned, the
idea that this view will be less widespread in more secularized countries, can be confirmed.
Indeed such a view prevails in the tradional countries like Ireland, Poland and Romania. But
in case of the immanentist view, the pattern is highly confusing, because even in the most
traditional believing countries, this view is as dominant as in the most secular countries.
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The results yield some evidence that religion is still a relevant factor for shaping the world
views of Europeans. Catholic countries like Austria, Italy, Spain, and Portugal appear as
opposites of Protestant countries like Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, and Norway. The transcen-
dental view prevails in these Catholic countries, while the immantist view is less accepted.
People in the Protestant countries are more in favour ofthe immantist view, while they hardly
adhere to the transcendental views. However, Czech Republic resembles the Nordic countries,
while the patterns of the Baltic States are highly similar to the pattern of Southern Catholic
Europe. The fact that Ireland and Poland do not fit in the Catholic pattern of Southern Europe,
seems to suggest that other factors than religious traditions are more important.
3.1.5 Homogeneity of religious beliefs and world views?
As we have argued in Section 2 of this chapter, due to increasing individualization, people
have become free and autonomous in selecting the convictions, beliefs, and practices they
want. Decisions are no longer based on what the religious institutions prescribe, but what the
individual wants. People are assumed to pick and choose what they want from the global
religious and cultural marketplace. In other words, in modern globalized society, people's
beliefs will be increasingly diverse and fragmented. `Since cultural and social diversity are the
distinguishing characteristics of modern life, individuals or groups in the global village can
choose their religious orientations from a variety of options rather than simply accepting the
specific sacred canopy transmitted to them by their family and friends in early childhood'
(Kurtz, 1995: 12). In this regard, the increased "supply" of alternative world views and value
systems, provided not least by the ever growing mass media and international information
technologies, will be a crucial factor. When people are increasingly free to choose from an
enlarged pool of religious and moral options, the homogeneity in peoples' religio-moral value
systems will almost by statistical necessity decrease. Increasing numbers of people will
demonstrate their own, individual religious patchworks.
The degree of religious homo- or heterogeneity can easily be assessed by the standard devia-
tions for the various dimensions of religious beliefs. The larger these standard deviations, the
more a populations varies in their opinions. If all people in a country believe in a similar way,
there is no variety and thus the standard deviation is 0. If people do not share similar religious
beliefs, the variety is high and thus the standard deviation will be high too. So, the more
varied a population, the higher the standard deviation; while if `the homogeneity of a group is
large, the smaller the standard deviation' (Jagodzinski 8z Dobbelaere, 1995b: 226). In Figure
3.5 these standard deviations are displayed.
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The expectation that the more modernized and globalized a country is, the more divers its
religious pattern will be, can not be substantiated by these data. In most countries, even in the
more modern, globalized parts of Europe, populations appear rather homogeneous in their
religious beliefs or non-beliefs.
The populations of Eastern Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Belgium appear less
homogeneous compared with other European populations as far as variations in religiosity is
concerned. The population of Latvia is rather homogeneous in (non-) belief in the traditional
religious dogmas, while the populations of Italy, Norway, and Slovakia appear more diverse
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Figure 3.5 Countries' standard deviations from the mean scores on religiosity, tradi-
tional belief, transcendental and immanentist world views
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There is also not a discernable trend of homogeneity in traditional belief and heterogeneity in
modern belief or the other way around. The pattern that emerged is hard to interpret and
cannot be understood in terms of a North-South, East West divide or in terms of Catholic-
Protestant identity~affiliation. What can be concluded is that in general the deviations from the
mean are rather limited in most countries and thus most populations in Europe appear as
rather homogeneous in their world views and religious orientations.
The preliminary conclusion from this overview is that religious beliefs vary within Europe to
a substantial extent. The more religious countries not only display higher levels of religious-
ness in terms of personal religious beliefs, but also in terms of traditional faith. Further, the
populations in these countries appear most homogeneous. However, contrary to what could
have been expected, even in least religious countries, people appear rather homogeneous in
their disbelief and rejection of traditional belief. It seems as if in these more secular parts of
Europe, secularization has spread all over the population and that it is not limited to specific
parts of the population. It seems as if Soviet socialization over 40 years was rather effective.
3.2 Religious practices
Religiousness measured in terms of beliefs is, of course, just one way of exploring an individ-
ual's religiousness. Religion is, according to one of the founding fathers of sociology `a
unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart
and forbidden - beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community...' (Durk-
heim, 1965: 62). Religious practices or `acts of worship and devotion, the things people do to
carry out their religious commitment' (Stark 8L Glock, 1968: 15), are other expressions of
religion. This dimension can be measured in various ways, for example by church member-
ship and actual participation in church activities. The empirical findings on church attendance
suggest that the uniting force of the churches has been lost for most people and even for a
large part of the church community itself. We start this section with acts of worship followed
by more attitudinal measures of people's adherence to institutional religiosity.
3.2.1 Worship
Church attendance is the most frequently used instrument to measuring religious practices,
and in many countries levels of church attendance have decreased. The decrease that has
occurred during the eighties is further explored in Section 5. Here we will compare the levels
of church attendance in 1990 in countries in Eastern and Western Europe. As a measure of
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secularisation it is immedately clear from figures on regular church attendance, that the
Nordic countries in Europe are highly secularized; around l00~0 of the populations in these
countries regularly (that is at least once a month) attend a religious service, while people in
Southern European countries are much less secularized according to church attendance
figures. The highest figures on church involvement is found, however, in two Catholic coun-
tries: Ireland and Poland. Here very large majorities go to church frequently (840~o and 880~0
respectively). The Bulgarian pattern resembles the Nordic one, but it deviates from the pattern
of church attendance observed in Rumania, although both are primarily Orthodox countries;
Church attendance is rather low in Bulgaria (90~0), whereas it is modest (about 30oro) in Roma-
nia.
As a secular ideology, individualism was expected to have been conducive to decreasing
levels of church going. In some countries individualization even led to leaving the church one
was born into. Until recently it was common that from their birth on, children belonged to the
denomination their parents belonged to. In the Netherlands a sharp distinction existed for a
long time in history between Catholics and Protestants milieus. This situation is famous as
pillarization. There was a Catholic pillar that differed from a Protestant pillar. Belonging to a
Catholic pillar implied that a person grew up in a Catholic family, that he~she went to a
Catholic school, that he~she became member of a Catholic youth organization, that helshe
went to a Catholic University, that he~she was employed in a Catholic enterprise with a
Catholic employer, that helshe belonged to a Catholic labour Union, that helshe went to a
Catholic hospital, that he~she voted on Catholic political parties etc. etc. Protestants grew up
and lived in Protestant milieu that was separated and segregated from Catholic milieu. Mean-
while a process of depolarisation has removed most of this typical Dutch pattern and many
people in the Netherlands do not any longer want to be part of either the Catholic or Protestant
church. Half of the Dutch population is unchurched, a proportion unparalleled in Western
Europe, not even in the Nordic secular countries.
In fact, church affiliation in the Nordic countries is rather high (Figure 3.6). Almost all people
in the four Scandinavian countries consider themselves a member of the Lutheran church.
This phenomenon of high levels of church membership may be understood from the connec-
tion between Church and state in these countries. In Scandinavia `there exists an historically
determined connection between church and state, and (....) citizenship implied church mem-
bership' (Gustafsson, 1994: 21). People in the Nordic countries entered into the Lutheran
church by birth (Lane 8z Ersson, 1996: 184), and being a church member is considered almost
a citizen's duty in these cultures and as such church membership can be seen as a way of
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expressing solidarity with society and it's basic values (Hamberg, 1990: 39). However, since
the level of actual participation is rather low in the Nordic countries, membership in these
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Figure 3.6 Proportions of respondents attending religious services regularly (at least
once a month) and belonging to a denomination
A clear Eastern European pattern is lacking, for in some countries church affiliation appears
high (Poland, Romania, Slovakia), in other countries it is rather low (Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Latvia). Hungary and Lithuania display intermediate positions. This
variation can hardly be explained from social repression during Soviet domination, although
the low rates in Eastern Germany, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, seem to confirm the
severe impact of secular Soviet rule in the recent past. In Slovakia, Poland, and Romania,
communist leadership has apparently not been very successful in paralysing the churches.
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Rather peculiar is the clear demarcation in participation and affiliation between the Czech
Republic and Slovakia. This may very well reflect differential stages of economic develop-
ment and modernization, and differences in social-historical experiences. As Inglehart sug-
gests, the main feature of modernization is economic growth through industrialization (Ing-
lehart, 1997: 70). The Czech Republic has been more advanced economically and industrially
than its Slovak neighbour country, and thus secularization will have advanced more in the
Czech Republic than in Slovakia.
Apart froin Poland, Ireland and Northern Ireland, the rather high levels of church affiliation is
not parallelled with high levels of church attendance. As far as an individual's religious
attachment is concerned, the Eastern European pattern resembles the Nordic pattern of a low
degree of active church involvement. The Polish and Irish pattern of church involvement is
highly similar. Figures on church attendance appear rather similar in the Southern European
countries, Austria and Slovakia, but these countries vary slightly in terms of proportions of
church membership which appears high in Spain, Italy, an Austria, and relatively low in
Slovakia and Portugal.
3.2.2 Institutional religious attitudes
Apart from these concrete behaviours, EVS contains several indicators of what can be called
institutional religious attitudes. A first set of indicators measures the degree to which people
consider religious ceremonies important for marked transitions in human life, such as birth,
marriage and death. Further, there are some indicators available about the role of the church in
contemporary society. As was explained before, an important aspect of secularization is the
assumed decline of the role the churches play in modern secular society. The degree to which
people are of the opinion that the churches should speak out on various issues is one aspect;
another is the degree to which people consider the churches and their leaders important
sources for answers to social, moral and familial problems and spiritual needs.
3.2.2.1. Rites of passage
Religion offers ceremonies to mark important passages in human life, such as, birth, marriage
and death. The proportions of people considering a religious ceremony meaningful for such
events'' are presented in Figure 3.7. Although the meaningfulness of religious services varies
for the separate occasions, generally speaking there is a tendency to regard such a service in
the case of death as more important than in the case of birth or marriage. Even in Eastern
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Germany, where fewer than 400~o consider a religious service necessary at birth and for a
marriage, a(small) majority say that a religious service is necessary at death. Relatively large
differences between death on the one hand and marriage and birth on the other, appear distinc-
tive in the Scandinavian countries. A religious ceremony at death is more widely accepted
than a religious service at birth or marriage. The Dutch and Czech patterns are highly similar,
and together with Eastern Germany, the people in these countries are least convinced that a
religious ceremony on the occasions of birth, marriage and death are necessary.
Despite these cross-national variations and the fact that the acceptance depends upon the
occasion, it will be clear that most Europeans regard events like birth, marriage and death
sufficiently significant to merit a religious ceremony. Such widespread acceptance seems
contradictory to the low levels of church involvement in terms of church attendance. How-
ever, it must be acknowledged that participation in such religious ceremonies is not necessar-
ily an expression of religious involvement. It rather reveals that the number of alternatives to
mark such important transitions in human life is limited (Dobbelaere 8L Voye, 1992: 128), and
that it is more or less a habit or a national custom to have religious ceremonies on such
occasions without further motivation or reflection. This is clear from the large proportions of
people who do not or hardly ever go to church, but nevertheless think that religious services
are important at birth, marriage and death. Even among those who have left the church most
are convinced about the importance of such ceremonies. As such, religious services on these
occasions have become part of a more general culture, devoid of religious meaning for a large
part of the population. The latter explanation seems likely because the percentages of those
who stick to the rites of passage greatly exceed the proportions of those who see themselves
as religious persons. Countries vary in the proportion of people to whom these rites are likely
to be devoid of religious meaning. Not only are there countries in which some of the
unchurched stick to the rites, there are also countries in which a considerable proportion of
even church members attach little or no value to them. This last finding applies to the Nordic
countries and to West Germany, which justifies the conclusion that a large part of the SSoro
marginal church members in the latter country have actually broken away from their church.
3.2.2.2. The role of the church(es)
According to the prevailing ideas on modernization, secularization and individualization,
institutional religiosity in particular has diminished and the role of religion and the churches
in society has been reduced to a specialized institution and above all a highly private affair.
And as Luckmann argues, in modern society `the individual is more likely to confront the
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culture and the sacred cosmos as a"buyer". Once religion is defined as a"private affair" the
individual may choose from the assortment of "ultimate" meanings as he sees fit - guided by










30--~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
fr gb wg nl be au it sp pt de no sw ic ni ir eg hu pl bu cz sl ro es la li
--.-- birth -.-- marriage ~ death
Figure 3.7 Proportions of respondents who are of the opinion that religious services
are important at birth, marriage and death
Thus, the expectation can be forwarded that the more modern, secular and individualized
countries will display lower levels of church oriented attitudes. The number of people at-
tracted by the doctrines and prescriptions of the traditional churches will be low in such
modern cultures. However, country specific features will have a significant impact on the role
of the churches in a society. For example, in Eastern Europe `religion happened to be the only
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source of counter-culture in the communist era which had an effect on every social stratum.
(...) Since that time there has been no other agency of comparable size undertaking the role of
preserving and transmitting national culture and basic values' (Tomka, 1995: 20). In the
Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, the impact of the churches is rather limited; the
churches, for example, do not get involved in political debate. `It is not legitimate to enter
political discussions, about the policy of the government or about vital social problems such
as unemployment' (Riis, 1992: 3). As such, a clear distinction can be expected to exist be-
tween the countries in Eastern Europe and the Nordic countries.
In EVS, people were asked if it was proper for churches to speak out on a great number of
issues ranging from disarmament, unemployment and third world problems to abortion,
homosexuality and euthanasia4. The answers seem to indicate what people consider to be the
role of the church in contemporary society, and a two dimensional pattern appears. One
dimension concerns the public or social issues, such as disarmament, third world problems,
unemployment, racial discrimination, ecology and environmental issues, and government
policy; the other dimension combines the private issues: abortion, extramarital affairs, eutha-
nasia, and homosexuality.
Most accepted, and in most countries even highly accepted, is that churches speak out on third
world problems and discrimination (see Figure 3.8). Belgium and Denmark display lower
levels of acceptance, but even in these countries a majority considers it appropriate for chur-
ches to speak out on these issues. Contrary to what might have been expected, Polish people
are not the most likely to consider that it is proper for churches to speak out on such public
issues. The same applies in the case of the Polish response to private issues which does not
rank highest compared with other countries. In all countries investigated here, only small
minorities think it is proper for churches to speak out on government policy. This is even the
case in Eastern European countries, despite the fact that, as Tomka has argued, the church was
seen as playing an oppositional role in these countries. Our data reveal that this is only the
case in Eastern Germany, for only in this country do more than half of the respondents say it
is proper for churches to speak out on government policy. In other countries, including those
in Eastern Europe, the proportions are much lower. The suggestion offered by Riis for the
Nordic countries is supported, although the percentages found in these countries are not the
lowest observed in Europe. France, Belgium, Austria, Portugal and Slovakia display the
lowest proportions of people who think that it is proper for churches to speak out on govern-
ment policy.
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Variations between countries also exist with regard to the sexual-ethical issues, such as
abortion, extramarital affairs, euthanasia and homosexuality (Figure 3.9). The Irish are most
of all of the opinion that churches should speak out on such issues, particularly with respect to
abortion and euthanasia (around 800~0). Here a significant difference between Irish and Polish
societies appears. Although large majorities in Poland feel that churches should speak out on
such issues, these proportions are lower than in Ireland. Lowest acceptance of churches to
speak out on such issues is found in France and Slovakia. In Slovakia about 190~0 of the
respondents consider it appropriate for the churches to speak out on homosexuality. In France,
Belgium, and Iceland it is around 250~0 of the respondents that shares this opinion. Further, it
is remarkable that such a large majority in East Germany find it proper for churches to speak
out on euthanasia. 700~0 of the East Germans is of this opinion, which is almost twice as much
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Figure 3.8 Proportions of respondents sharing the opinion that churches should
speak out on disarmament, third world problems, unemployment, dis-
crimination, environmental issues, and governmental policy
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The large variations in response rates, not only between countries, but also between the issues
mentioned, make it difficult to draw conclusions. We therefore have applied factor analysis,
resulting in two dimensions: public or social issues on the one hand, and private issues on the
other hand. An overall picture of the cross-national varieties can be obtained from Figure
3.10, where we present the mean (factor) scores for each country on both dimensions which
we have tentatively labelled private and publics.
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Figure 3.9 Proportions of respondents sharing the opinion that churches should
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Figure 3.10 Countries' mean scores on private and public issues
People in both Irish countries, more than people in other countries, are of the opinion that
churches should speak out on these issues, be it private or public. People in East Germany are
of the opinion that it is proper for the churches to speak out on public issues, but in case of
private issues they are more reluctant to consider this appropriate. The people in Slovakia are
least likely to accept the role of the church in either public or private affairs. The Czechs are
almost as reluctant as Slovak people to accept churches to speak out on private issues, but
they do not resemble the Slovak people in not accepting the churches to speak out on public
issues. Irish people accept most of all that the church expresses its views on both public and
private issues, and in this they are the opposite of people in Slovakia and, to a lesser extent,
Belgium. Although the results in Figure 3.10 are fascinating, a clear pattern is lacking. For
instance, people in Norway, Great Britain, and Spain appear similar in their views as far as the
acceptance of the authority of the church in public and private issues is concerned. Sweden,
Iceland, and the Netherlands are similar as well, as are France and Austria. Polish people







The suggestion that more modern, secular and individualized countries will display lower
levels of church-oriented attitudes leads also to the expectation that the idea that the churches
provide adequate answers to various problems will be less accepted in the Nordic countries,
whereas people in Southern Europe will be more eager to accept this role played by the
churches. In Figure 3.11 it can be seen that in all countries, even the more modern ones,
people regard the church as important in meeting the spiritual needs of the individual. The
churches are regarded in all countries less adequate to provide answers to social problems.
It may not be a big surprise that even among people in more modern societies, churches
appear popular for solving the spiritual needs. It has been argued that religion, particularly
under conditions of high modernity, is primarily concerned with spiritual issues, the sacred
and something beyond the perceptible (Beyer, 1994: 5). Religion and the churches provide
`categories and symbols that facilitate simultaneously man's comprehension of his circum-
stances and his capacity to evaluate them and to cope with them emotionally' (Wilson, 1982:
10). Apparently, most Europeans share this opinion. The churches provide answers to cope
with spiritual needs and these answers are considered adequate.
Less adequate are the answers the churches give to other problems. In case of family problems
and moral problems, more people in Eastern Europe than in the West of Europe regard the
churches replies as adequate. Tomka has observed that public opinion `in Hungary is firmly
behind the strengthening of the societal, cultural, and political role of the churches' (Tomka,
1995: 20), and it may be that similar views exist among other Eastern Europeans as well. The
expectation that church-oriented attitudes are less widespread in more modern societies seems
confirmed; least accepted is the role of the church in Denmark and Sweden. Only small
minorities in these Nordic countries share the opinion that the churches are giving adequate
answers to the problems mentioned.
The results yield some evidence for the idea that the churches nowadays are seen most of all
in connection with spiritual needs and not so much with issues concerning family life and
social problems. Even moral problems are not self-evidently seen as the concern of the
churches. This result seems to support the idea that `the religious sphere came fully into its
own, specializing in "its own religious" function and either dropping or losing many other
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Figure 3.11 Proportions of respondents agreeing that the church gives adequate an-
swers to moral problems, family problems, spiritual needs, and social
problems
Some patterns appear strange, all the same. The Irish case for instance is unclear for despite
the fact that the Irish appear the most religious and most traditional in their beliefs, only about
two-fifths of its population is of the opinion that the church gives adequate answers to social
and family problems. Even among the Irish who frequently attend religious services, the
pattern is the same. Such proportions are among the lowest in all countries investigated here,
and they are even below the figures found in Eastern Europe where the role of the churches
has been rather modest. As we will see later on, the Irish have become less reliant on the chur-
ches during the eighties.
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4. Catholic and Protestant cultures: distinctive or similar?
The religious profiles of the European countries presented thus far, yield often large differ-
ences, but also remarkable and sometimes unexpected similarities. However, a clear and
understandable pattern does not appear from these data, and the question to be answered is
how to explain the differences and similarities.
Differential patterns are, however, to be expected, because it has been argued that there are
longstanding ideological differences between Catholic and Protestant cultures, not only in
religious beliefs, but also in terms of inentality and social and political attitudes. Such differ-
ences between both religious traditions are still `alive and well' (Greeley, 1989: 500). An
important feature of the Catholic tradition is the directedness towards the community and
shared responsibility, whereas Protestant traditions proclaim more individualistic stances. It
has been argued that as a result Protestants are more rational, more individualistic and more
autonomous than Catholics (Peters 8c Schreuder, 1987). Consequently, Protestants are as-
sumed to be more sensitive to various `modernizing' influences than Catholics (Weber, 1979;
Durkheim, 1966; Tracy, 1981).
The results of our analyses thus far, do not provide much evidence for a Catholic-Protestant
divide in Europe. Although, Ireland and Poland appear most religious in many respects, and
the Nordic Protestant countries least religious, the pattern is not as clear as such observations
might suggest. For instance, East German Protestantism seems to have resulted in a religious
pattern that is quite distinctive from the Nordic pattern. Much more than people in the Scandi-
navian countries, East Germans are of the opinion that churches should speak out on public
issues. The Catholic countries in Southern Europe appear less religious than Poland and
Ireland, and dominant Catholic countries like France and Belgium often appear as secular as
Denmark and Sweden. Further, it is remarkable that both Orthodox countries, Romania and
Bulgaria, display such different patterns of religiosity. Romania is often close to the most
religious countries, while Orthodox Bulgaria belongs to the most secular parts of Europe.
A clear pattern of Catholic countries on the one hand, and Protestant countries on the other,
does not appear from these data. Does this mean that the Catholic and Protestant factors are no
longer important in present-day European society and that other cultural factors are more
important to explain cross-national varieties in religious attitudes?
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One of these factors may be the degree of competition, an idea that has been forwarded by
American researchers to explain the high levels of religiosity in the US despite the fact that
this country is most modern. As was explained by the proponents of the religious market
theory, the more pluralistic a country is religiously, the greater the religious vitality will be
(Finke, 1990; Iannaccone, 1991; Stark 8c Iannaccone, 1994). European countries vary to the
extent that they are mono- or pluriform religiously. The degree of pluralism is measured by
Herfindahl's index. This index measures `the probability that two people, selected at random
from those claiming a religious affiliation, share the same religion' (Iannaccone, 1991: 166).
Since a higher score on this index indicates less pluralism, a negative association can be
expected between this index and the religious measures (see also Verweij, Ester 8z. Nauta,
1997).
Another factor that will have an impact on people's religious attitudes is religious upbringing.
If one has been raised and socialized in a devout family, it is more likely that one is more
religious than someone who has not been raised in a devout family. In 1990 the EVS question-
naire included a question on this. In Ireland, Poland, Spain and Italy almost all respondents
indicated that they were brought up religiously at home, whereas at the other extreme, reli-
gious upbringing is rare in Estonia (15o~0), and in Sweden it was limited to 30oro of the respon-
dents.
In several multiple regression analyses we have defined as the dependent variable various
religious measures. As independent or predictor variables we included the proportion of
Catholics in a country, the Herfindahl index, and the proportion of people in a country that
was brought up religiously. The results indicate the strength of the impact of each of these
independent `country-characteristics'. In Table 3.5 we have displayed the pairwise (Pearson)
correlations between the religious indicators and Herfindahl's index, proportion of Catholics,
and proportions of respondents brought up religiously.
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Table 3.4 Proportion of Catholics, proportions of respondents brought up religiously
and Herfindahl index in 25 European countries
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Both religious upbringing and numbers of Catholics appear to have significant impact on
religiosity, traditional faith, transcendent world-view, church adequacy, and rites of passage.
The impact of the degree to which people in a country have been brought up religiously is
slightly stronger than the impact of the number of Catholics in a country. The low correlations
between the various religious indicators and Herfindahl's index do not support the suggestion
that pluralistic religious countries are more religious than mono-religious countries. The
opposite seems more true: the correlations, although statistically not significant, are not
negative, as expected, but positive.
Since religious upbringing is more common in Catholic countries than in Protestant countriesb
we have calculated the partial correlations between the religious indicators and religious
upbringing, controlling for the proportions of Catholics. Most associations increased as a
result of the introduction of this control variable. In particular, the correlation between church
attendance and religious upbringing increased. Controlling for the proportions of Catholics,
the correlation is .63 (p - .000).
The impact of religious upbringing is thus significant, but also the proportion of Catholics
appears also to be a major attribute of country differences and similarities in religiosity.
Nevertheless, we cannot find a clear Catholic-Protestant divide in Europe. Apparently other
factors are more important than the distinction between Catholics and Protestants. This
becomes clear from a comparison of the religious profiles of Catholics and Protestants in
West Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands. All three countries have large numbers of
people belonging to both of these religious traditions.
In Figure 3.12 we have displayed the main differences between Catholics and Protestants in
Great Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands as far as their degree of religiosity and
traditional belief is concerned. The comparisons reveal that Catholics in the Netherlands are
more secular than the Dutch Protestants, whereas in Great Britain and Germany, the situation
is reversed: here the Protestants represent the more secular part ofthe population.
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Table 3.5 Pairwise correlations between percentage Catholics in a country, a country's
Herfindahl index, percentage of people who were brought up religiously on
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5. The decline of religious beliefs and practices?
Grace Davie has interpreted the European religious situation not so much in terms of a reli-
gious decline, but more in terms of believing without belonging. In her words, `many Europe-
ans have ceased to belong to their religious institutions in any meaningful sense, but they have
not abandoned, so far, many of their deep-seated religious motivations' (Davie, 1992: 223).
Indeed, if belonging is measured by church attendance she maybe right, for attendance figures
have decreased in general, but in terms of church membership her conclusion can hardly be
confirmed, for, as we have seen, in most countries church membership is still rather high.
A comparison of the 1990 data with the data collected in 1981 enable us to explore questions
as to whether or not levels of church involvement have declined, religious beliefs have chan-
ged and if the populations in Europe are converging or diverging in their religious orientations
and practices. Further it is possible to investigate if a country's overall pattern of change is
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Figure 3.12 Degrees of religiosity and traditional belief for Catholics and Protestants
in The Netherlands, West Germany and Great Britain (mean scores)
5.1 The decline of religious beliefs and practices
All the measures of religiousness which we have constructed, display a tendency to decline in
Western Europe. However, to what extent this overall decline is indeed representative for all
European countries cannot be inferred from such overall patterns. Since each country has had
its own particular experiences, its own historical heritage and developments, differential
patterns are to be expected (cf. Casanova, 1994; Dobbelaere, 1995). These differential patterns
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Figure 3.13 Changes in religiousness in thirteen countries
This overview reveals, generally speaking, that religiousness is indeed on the decline in
Europe. Italy is one of the exceptions to this observation. Italians appear to have become more
religious and even more religious in a traditional, institutional way. However, as in most other
countries, Italians follow the European route of institutional decline in the sense that fewer
Italians in 1990 than in 1981 share the opinion that the church is giving adequate answers to
various problems in society. The apparent increase of religiousness among Italians may be
due to the item `belief in a personal God'. In 1981 and 1990 the item was not translated in te
same way, and this resulted in a sharp increase in the number of people who `believe in a
personal God'. Whereas in 1981 about 280~0 of the Italians declared to believe in a personal
God, this figure increased during the eighties to 67oro.
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Although the decline in levels of traditional belief are in most countries statistically not
significant, the pattern of decline is clear. Orthodoxy decreased most in Spain. Casanova
concluded already that `Spain not only has joined the European Community but also has
apparently adopted the general European pattern of secularization' (Casanova, 1994: 90). The
religious decline in Spain may be attributed, according to Casanova, to the internalization of
democratic principles by the Spanish population. As such the decline is connected with the
disappearance of the Franco regime. This disappearance can also be regarded an explanation
for the (small) increase in the degree to which Spanish people think that the churches are
giving adequate answers to various problems in society. Spain is to only country where an
increase can be observed, and it is likely that this increase is due to the fact that the Catholic
church in Spain is no longer closely linked with Franco's dictatorial regime. As Casanova
reports, the Spanish church has been transformed tremendously since the 1970s. From then
on, the churches openly demanded `the liberalization and democratization of the regime' and,
possibly even more importantly, the Catholic church publicly confessed the sin `for the role
played by the church in the Spanish Civil War' (Casanova, 1992: 85).
More important than the declining levels of religious orthodoxy is the decline in religiosity
and the adequacy of the churches' answers throughout Europe, Italy being the exception to
this general rule as far as religiosity is concerned. Particularly in Denmark a rather sharp
decrease in general religiosity has occurred. The decline in numbers of people who say that
the church provides adequate answers to various problems indicates the increasingly marginal
role the churches are playing in present day societies, and as such the institution of religion
seems on the decline. The decline in the extent to which people in Ireland feel that the church
gives adequate answers is remarkable, for this country has remained one of the most religious
countries in Europe. However, it seems to indicate that even in this country `there has been a
collapse in the `moral monopoly' of the church' (Hornsby-Smith 8r. Whelan, 1994: 41). In
Spain, as in most other countries, this seems to be reflected in the (relatively) sharp decline in
church attendance. Levels of church attendance also declined in those countries which had
low church attendance rates in 1981, such as Sweden and Norway. In France a small increase
in church attendance can be noted, as is the case in Britain and Iceland, but these increases are
statistically not significant.
The question of converging or diverging religious patterns can be answered in various ways,
although one has to be very careful, for longitudinal analyses are needed covering a wider
time span than are now available. However, if the distances between the mean scores of the
countries have diminished, one may conclude that the countries religious positions have
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become more similar, and thus that convergence has occurred. A simple comparison of the
distance between the most extreme scores in 1981 and 1990 is thus a first indication of
convergence or divergence.
Convergence can also be explored by examining developments within countries. If religious
decline is strongest in countries that were (still) highly religious in 1981 than in countries that
were less religious in 1981, it can be concluded that a process of convergence has taken place.
Finally, whether or not convergence has occurred can be inferred from the (standard) devia-
tions from the mean in both years. In case of convergence, the (standard) deviations will have
diminished.
The distances between the extreme mean scores appeared to have increased on all four mea-
sures of religiousness, yielding a process of increasing difference between the most religious
and least religious countries. However, the results are dependent upon which measure of
religiousness is considered. For instance, the decline in religiosity in the Scandinavian coun-
tries is more marked than the decline in Ireland, whereas the declines in traditional belief
appear less significant in both the most and least religious countries. When it comes to the
decline in the opinions that the churches provide adequate answers to various problems, it is
highly significant in Ireland but also in the Scandinavian countries and France. Church
attendance decreased more in Sweden and Norway than it did in the Irish Republic.
This highly confusing result appears also from the comparisons of the (standard) deviations on
the religiousness measures in 1981 and 1990. The standard deviations in both years differ
significantly, and on most measures the variation around the overall mean declined. Only in
the case of general religiosity can an increase be observed, but the European populations
appeared more homogeneous in their orthodoxy, church adequacy and church attendance in
1981 than in 1990.
5.2 The religious decline
The analyses thus far all indicate a general trend of declining religiousness in most European
countries, whether this is measured in terms of orthodox beliefs, religiosity or confidence in
the churches. This decline in religious convictions is accompanied by a decline in church
involvement. At the aggregate level, societies seem to have become less devout, but the
overall trend of decline may be differential and more typical for certain groups in society. For
example, age is related to religious attitudes and behaviours in the sense that younger people
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appear more secular and less pious compared with the older people. As a consequence of this,
it might be expected that, while youngsters will replace the elderly in society, society as such
will become more secular and less devout. Religious value change can, in such a case, be
attributed to the phenomenon of generation replacement. Generational or cohort effects
suggest that there will be a gradual replacement of existing values by those of young people
who form the `leading' generation in value terms; the values held by young people will come
to represent the views of society in general as successive generations replace each other and
the values of older generations die out. For example as younger generations replace the old,
they retain their less religious attitudes and thus society becomes more secular.
However, such a development presupposes that people's value orientations remain stable over
time. Ron Inglehart's theory on political value change from materialism to post-materialism is
grounded on such ideas of stable orientations (Inglehart, 1977; 1990; 1997). It might be asked,
however, if this assumption holds for religious orientations as well. Aging often implies more
reflection on life, and when people are approaching the end stages of their lives, they are often
inclined to become increasingly interested in issues concerning the meaning and purpose of
life and death. Religion provides answers to such basic questions of ultimate meaning (e.g.
Geertz, 1973: 96; McGuire, 1987: 9; Wilson, 1982: 10), and aging can thus imply a return to
religiosity and an increasing level of religiousness or even devoutness. If this is indeed the
case, the replacement of generations does not necessarily mean a further decrease of religious-
ness. As one becomes older, one might become more religious and thus the overall decline
will be hampered or even turn into a religious revival. Aging or life-cycle effect suggests that
as individuals grow older, their values change so that the distinctive values of young people
today will come to resemble the values we now see among older generations when young
people reach an equivalent age. In this way, the values of older generations come to be
successively reproduced as younger people gradually grow into the values of their forebears.
In order to explore in greater detail what is really going on we have analysed different age
groups in society. Eight age groups are distinguished in both 1981 and 1990. The youngest
generation in 1981 (18-26) has been replaced by another generation of youngest people (18-
26) in 1990. Persons aged 18-26 in 1981 are the second youngest generation in 1990 (27-35).
The oldest age group in 1981 (81 and over) has been replaced by another generation of 81 and
over. This group was aged 72-80 in 1981. For each of these age groups means for the three
religious orientations, as well as for church attendance, were calculated. By comparing the age
groups on both years, inter-generational shifts appear, whereas intra-generational changes
occur in comparing various age groups in time (aged 18-26 in 1981 compared with 27-35 in
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1990 and so on).
The overall European results are presented in Table 3.6. The differences between younger and
older generations are obvious. Young people are less religious than older people. Age is thus
positively correlated with these varióus measures of religiousness. During the eighties the
differences between the oldest and youngest age groups increased on most indices. Church
adequacy being an exception. The youngest age groups are less religious compared to the age
groups they are replacing. For instance, the 18-27 years group in 1990 is less religious than
the same age group in 1981. But as can be seen in the last column of Table 3.6 aging seems to
increase the level of religiosity. Not only for the older age groups, but also for the youngest
age groups. In other words, as people get older their religiosity seems to increase.
Inter-generational differences appear also in levels of traditional belief. The youngest age
group in 1990 is less orthodox in its belief than the age group it is replacing. In other words,
shifts in traditional beliefs will be due to the replacement of generations. The levels of ortho-
doxy do not seem to change to a significant degree as people get older.
Older generations attend religious services more frequently than younger generations. This
still holds in 1990, but the differences between the oldest and youngest generation increased.
The replacement of age groups implies a further decline in church attendance. However,
getting older means, in general, that people attend religious services more frequently. The
latter does not apply to the youngest age group in 1981. In 1990 this age group attended
religious services less frequently than the youngest age group in 1981.
Although the differences between the successive cohorts appear rather small and often statisti-
cally not significant, the replacement of generations will imply a further decline in religious-
ness. Further, the figures indicate that aging results in increasing levels of religiosity, at least
measured by what we have called general or personal religiosity. All age groups have devel-
oped in a more pious direction and they are attending religious services more frequently in
1990 than in 1981. However, this is not so much the case as far as orthodoxy and church
adequacy is concerned. The levels of traditional belief appear to remain rather stable over
time; aging does not seem to affect the belief-content. Aging does affect the degree to which
people are convinced that the churches are giving adequate answers to various problems in
society. For most age groups aging seems to imply a loss of church's authority.
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Table 3.6 Changes in religiousness over time between and within eight age groups in
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Unfortunately, such observations camouflage the wide variety in developments within differ-
ent countries. Although the overall pattern of change seems to point to institutional decline,
and to a much lesser extent to a religious decline, for religiosity increases as one becomes
older whereas confidence in the churches seems to decline, this pattern is far from uniform
throughout Europe. There appear important exceptions to the overall findings, causing some-
times an increase in religiousness in certain age groups, sometimes a decrease. This counts for
all measures we have developed for religiousness. Elsewhere we have displayed the figures
for each age group in all European countries (Halman, 1992).
Because the increase in religiosity as one gets older is smaller than the differences between
the age groups and their successor age groups or cohorts, it is to be expected that religiosity
will decrease in the long run. The same applies to orthodoxy. The decrease will be mainly due
to the replacement of age groups. Contrary to these developments, the general picture of intra-
generational change in church adequacy is that of decrease. Aging implies a further decrease
in levels of confidence in the church and together with the finding that younger cohorts show
less confidence in the church than the older ones, confidence levels will further decrease.
6. Conclusions
The main purpose of this chapter was to present an overview of contemporary religiousness in
European societies, and to explore the recent shifts in religious patterns. The dominant theme
in societal's subdomain of religion is secularization. The concept of secularization denotes a
process of cultural change in which religion is of decreasing importance in human society.
According to the common understanding ofthis process, secularization is reflected in decreas-
ing levels of behavioural practices and religious beliefs, but also in the shift from traditional
religious authority to secular rational authority, and more recently to individual autonomy.
Secularization is, however, just one of the many processes of societal change, but in general it
is considered one of the most significant and far reaching processes that have transformed
human society.
In this chapter we have explored how far this process of secularization has proceeded in
Europe. Is Europe indeed as secular as has frequently been assumed? And what are the main
religious profiles which can be discerned?
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At the onset it was considered highly unlikely that a homogeneous European religious pattern
would appear. Europe comprises a mixture of countries that despite common roots, differ
markedly in their social-historical experiences, political and social structures, and cultural
settings. For example, an important distinction in this respect was assumed to exist between
Catholics and Protestants. Although there are some marked differences between Catholic and
Protestant people in their religious orientations. We have not been able to discover clear and
distinctive Catholic and Protestant religious profiles in Europe, and as such our analyses seem
to contradict the findings of Ron Inglehart who reported a coherent Catholic group of coun-
tries with highly similar value profiles (Inglehart, 1997: 95).
Another demarcation line was assumed to exist between Eastern and Western Europe. The
secular doctrines of the Communist regimes and the Soviet authorities strongly repressed
religious activism in Eastern European countries. However, they did not succeed to the same
extent in all countries, creating large variations in religious and secular patterns. Eastern
Germany, in many respects the model country of Soviet society to the West (Gautier, 1997:
292), is indeed highly secular, but Poland remained highly religious in all respects.
More important than the Catholic-Protestant divide were the different levels of religious
upbringing. But this does not bring us much further in the understanding of cross-national
variations for the question then becomes why religious upbringing is more important in one
country and less in another? Such results confirm the conclusions from previous empirical
studies, that nation-specific historical interpretations are indispensable for the understanding
and explanation of variations of religious orientations. Europe remains the `melting pot' that it
has always been.
It is hard, if not impossible, to understand and explain the different patterns of religiousness in
Europe. A multitude of factors will be responsible for the observed differences and similari-
ties. The analyses seem to indicate that despite the cross-national varieties in religious pat-
terns, decline is most marked with respect to institutional religiosity, and less important as far
as personal religiosity is concerned. We have seen that aging implies increasing levels of
religiosity but not higher levels of confidence in the churches. On the contrary, as one be-
comes older, the levels of confidence in the church decrease. Of course, such interpretations
are tentative, for they are based on two measurements in time only; more time points are
needed to draw firmer conclusions as to what is taking place in contemporary Europe. Further,
the understanding and interpretation of what is taking place in the religious subsystem is
dependent upon the definition of religion that is used. Substantive definitions of religion are
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rather restrictive and, usually in such definitions, reference is made to a higher order, or a
supra-natural realm (McGuire, 1987: 7). Our analyses seem to indicate that such a religion is
indeed on the decline. People living in present-day society adhere less to the traditional
institutional religious doctrines, they have less confidence in the church and their leaders than
in the 1981 s, and they attend religious ceremonies less frequently than before.
Functional definitions allow for more phenomena to be regarded as religious, for such defini-
tions do not focus on what religion is, but what the functions of religion are. As such they are
much broader and commonsensical (McGuire, 1987: 9). According to Yinger (1977), religion
has to do with `ultimate concerns'. Religion gives answers to the `ultimate problems of human
life' and it can be defined as `a set of symbolic forms and acts that relate man to the ultimate
conditions of his existence' (Bellah, 1970: 21). So, when defining religion in functional terms
it becomes clear that religion, and not only Western Christianity (see for instance Geertz,
1973), provides people with meaning and an interpretation of life events like suffering and
death. Secularisation seen from a functionalist view ofreligion means that people are either no
longer able or no longer choose to explain the origin and the meaning of the cosmos and of
human life in the context of a transcendent and supra-natural order.
Although traditional beliefs are on the decline, large majorities of the populations in Europe
still believe in a personal God or some sort of spirit or life force. The proportions of people
who do not believe in a personal God or life force are modest and atheism is not widespread at
all among Europeans. So, despite the fact that the theistic or transcendental beliefs seem to be
on the decline in most countries, people have not turned into disbelievers. The question to be
answered in the near future is, what comes instead of or next to this theistic and transcendental
belief systems? Or to put it in more popular terms: what alternative meaning systems are
arising?
ETIS cannot give adequate answers to such a question, but most attempts to discover alterna-
tives for traditional religiosity have failed. It is to be expected that there will be religious and
spiritual needs in the near future, but the solutions for such needs are to a lesser extent found
within traditional religious institutions. The European religious decline seems mainly con-
fined to a institutional decline.
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Notes
1. Recently an international project to explore world views in modern society has started (for
more information see Holm 8z Bjórkqvist, 1996).
2. Standard spssx hierarchical cluster analysis was applied using Ward Method.
3. It was asked whether one thought is was important to hold a religious service for any of
these events.
4. The items were: disarmament; abortion; third world problems; extramarital affairs; unem-
ployment; racial discrimination; euthanasia; homosexuality; ecology and environmental
issues; government policy.
5. The `private' dimensions contains the items: abortion, extramarital affairs, euthanasia,
homosexuality. The mean inter-item correlation between these items is .53; a-.82. The
`public' dimension refers to the other items, disarmament, third world problems, unem-
ployment, racial discrimination, ecology and environmental issues, governmental policy.
The mean inter-item correlation between these items is .45; a-.83.
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